Armenia2020

Diaspora-Homeland Issue Paper

prepared by the
Arak-29 Foundation (Yerevan)

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Diaspora & Homeland

I. Current status

The Armenian Diaspora is widely recognized as a unique asset and key to Armenia’s development. This Diasporan role has been varied since the beginning of the Karabagh Movement in 1988, and has included economic, charitable, geopolitical and cultural ties. High hopes are shared by all for a productive and beneficial relationship that in some instances have been realized, but in others have not yet developed. Even taking into account the objective difficulties of relationships among such a diverse, multi-lingual, multi-cultural group and the various objective contributions and successes, our survey results reveal a general sense of malaise. Whether this disappointment is a matter of unrealistic expectations, insufficient efforts, or various missteps in relationships, the gap between expectations and reality is for some a source of creative tension and engagement, and of antipathy and withdrawal for others. The relationship is at the same time complicated and simplified by the fact that a large majority of Armenians in Armenia have roots in the communities from which the Genocide era Western Diaspora was deported and exiled.

Armenia 2020 Survey Results show that despite their diversity, Armenians throughout the world share a strong consensus on a number of key national priorities: Maintaining a stable economy was ranked by both Diasporans and Armenians as the highest priority. Thereafter, Armenians in Armenia emphasized making Armenia the best place for Armenians from around the world to live (66%), safety (58%), and defense (48%); whereas Diasporans focused on health and education (75%), anticorruption (73%), and jobs (46%). It is perhaps understandable that for Armenians in Armenia physical security is more important than for Diasporans. Similarly, it is understandable that Diasporans viewing the world through the prism of their own secure lives, focus on socio-economic issues that dominate public discourse in modern societies. The fact that Diasporans ranked “anti-corruption” so high is both a matter of values and socialization (since most Diasporans surveyed live in more modern, resource-rich societies, with public sectors served by a well-paid, long-established civil service). In addition, corruption is perhaps the easiest scapegoat for the country’s problems and the easiest reason for not engaging more actively in building the new state. What is remarkable is that after their own security, Armenians in Armenia ranked making Armenia the best place for all Armenians to live as their second most important goal. Whether this is motivated by the emigration that has torn apart their families, a sense of historic mission, or oft-expressed yearning that exiled Armenians should want to return to an exemplary homeland, which those who are living there aspire to create, is an open question.

With the demographics and character of the Diaspora changing quite rapidly and dramatically, in particular due to the new wave of emigrés from Armenia, new opportunities and new challenges confront the Armenian people. The Mid-East Communities are dwindling, probably less than 500,000 in total and the model of Christian enclaves in a Muslim milieu is fading and becoming fossilized with them, much
as the 15-17th century Diasporan centers in India and Eastern Europe are now but vestiges of what they once were.

Chart of Diaspora Populations per Republic of Armenia Ministry of Foreign Affairs www.mfa.am site.

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population</th>
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The centers of gravity today are Russia and the United States-Canada, with France-England, Australia, Greece, the Mid-East, and South America, more often contributing, than leading, factors in the nation’s future. The Russian-US bi-polarism in the Diaspora may be a fault line or may mask the underlying convergence between Russian and US economic and geopolitical interests. Nevertheless, culturally Russian and US Diasporas have very different characters, in particular with regard to democratic experience and Christian values and practices. Moreover proximity and Russian hegemony over the Caucasus, combined with widespread Armenian-Russian biculturalism in Armenia give a distinctive and inescapable Russian tilt to all aspects of Armenian life – Armenian children have enough exposure to Russian in early childhood that they acquire a near native Russian language proficiency by the time they enter kindergarten.

Finally, as the waves of Armenians with roots in the Ottoman Empire and Mid-East enter into their third-generation in America, assimilation, intermarriage and cultural erosion submerge or peripheralize their Armenianness to such an extent that there is insufficient shared cultural material for them to interact easily with their counterparts in Armenia as Armenians. This disconnect usually leads to a more permanent estrangement, or rarely to a process of “finding one’s roots” (cf. Michael Arlen’s Passage to Ararat) in much the same way as a non-Armenian might become acculturated to Armenia, but often with little sense of ownership or identification.

Armenian identity is being radically reshaped due to dispersion, globalization, modernization, and secularization. Both Armenians in Armenia and Diasporans ranked belief in the future of Armenia first (common goal), followed by community participation as the most important characteristic of being Armenian (synchronic group affiliation), followed closely by having Armenian ancestors (diachronic group affiliation). Armenians in Armenia tended to emphasize command of expressive culture more (e.g., speak language), whereas Diasporans emphasized attitudes toward Armenian culture (e.g. embrace food and culture). Interestingly, Armenians in Armenia (40%) ranked being Christian as the second most important characteristic of an Armenian, whereas Armenians in the Diaspora ranked it lower than food and culture. Thus, Armenians under Soviet atheism, continued to view Christianity as the second most important
characteristic of their identity, while Armenians in the Diaspora appear to have been deeply affected by the secularism of majority cultures, where food and culture are classified as ethnicity and religion as a personal choice, and disengagement from the Church, which is often inaccessible both physically and spiritually because of dispersion and linguistic barriers.

Where enough Armenian identity remains, but the paucity of cultural understanding and cultural material is incommensurate with the sense of national ownership, cognitive dissonance develops, both for the Armenian from Armenia and for the Diasporan. Sometimes this dissonance resolves in rapprochement, with each side accommodating the other, but with the Diasporan making the longer journey back to his/her roots. Other times it results in disillusionment, creating either an alternative Armenian dream, or outright rejection.

Although dispersion is a process that has affected the Armenian nation for centuries, this report will focus on the past century, in particular, the post-Genocide dispersion and the subsequent waves of migration, exploring four key issues:

1. Current status: the role of the Armenian Diaspora today
2. Major driving forces influencing the role of the Armenian Diaspora and their relative importance
3. Major factors influencing the attitudes and the relations between the Armenian Diaspora and Armenian Government
4. Possible scenarios for development of the role of the Diaspora in Armenia
II. Some Critical Factors and Issues

Because of its historical evolution, the Armenian Diaspora currently diverges in certain ways from the classic model of “a nation dispersed from a common homeland.” This has resulted in two kinds of conceptual tensions:

1. Dispersed Armenians vs. Diaspora

The term “Diaspora” is used to refer simultaneously to at least two or three interrelated but distinct phenomena. In the Armenian case, it is often used indiscriminately to refer collectively to individuals of Armenian ancestry living outside their historic homeland (for discussion of “homeland” see Section 2 below), the institutions to which they belong (the organized community), geographically defined concentrations of individuals of Armenian ancestry. In short, the term refers to the totality of these and other sub-groupings or expressions of Armenian ethnicity.

Various models of Diaspora can be constructed, each of which tends to oversimplify some aspect of this richly diverse reality, thereby impeding our efforts to develop a shared understanding of the Armenian situation world-wide. For example, one model might treat the nation as an organic whole divided into two coherent parts: homeland and Diaspora. Another model might ignore the sub-groupings and institutions, dissolving the Diaspora into a collectivity of dispersed individuals of Armenian ancestry who have a variety of direct relations to the new Armenian state, only secondarily intermediated by institutions. A third model would treat institutions larger than the family as the primarily unit of analysis, leaving out the large unaffiliated population of Armenians world-wide who have only sporadic contact with the institutions of the organized community, but are part of the perceived “national asset” called the Diaspora that may seek some relationship with the independent Armenian state.

While each of these would produce fruitful perspectives, our analysis of survey results and interviews shows that the main fissure is between the Organized Community (with its elite structures and large benefactors) and the Silent Majority. Both the Organized Community and the Silent Majority are in flux and adapting to the evolving style and generation changes, new constituencies, and the re-emergence of Armenian statehood.

1.1. “Fixed Menu” Institutions that make up the Organized Community – e.g., Schools, Churches, Cultural, Charitable, Social, Athletic, Political Parties, Lobbies, Conferences, Trade Associations.

These institutions have only partially adapted to the generational changes in their constituencies, often continuing to view and serve the newest wave of immigrants
as their core constituency – something akin to a niche restaurant with a fixed menu that does not respond to changes in clientele tastes, preferring to maintain a menu for a discerning clientele, rather than becoming larger and more diverse, attracting a larger clientele, while concurrently endangering its niche or branding. Of course, the fixed menu is not fixed in an absolute sense, but as a mentality. It evolves slowly so as not to lose its identity or a core constituency, tending to become increasingly conservative, for as long as it lasts.

Because Armenian institutions are under-resourced, the core constituency tends to dominate the institutions, turning them into the province of a combination of benefactors and dedicated individuals plus elites willing to support and operate them at significant personal sacrifice. Consequently, there is a tendency for these institutions to be perceived through the lens of “personal/private ownership” rather than “public trust.” This tendency is further intensified by the juxtaposition of the relatively small size of most Armenian communities and institutions with the high level of family and friend relationships. The resulting high entry barriers leave little attraction for newcomers or the unaffiliated, or for changing tastes.

Like all analogies, the restaurant analogy fails at the point where the institutions claim to represent and serve the entire constituency. Their aspiration to be the bearers of the “public trust” of the Diaspora, to speak for all Armenians or at least be the voice of the Armenian people on certain key issues on which there is a consensus is at odds with the “fixed menu” approach. The imperative of inclusiveness and the “least common denominator” approach to community institutions in pursuit of “common ground” is at tension with the exclusiveness, partisanship and branding of these institutions. A “love it or leave it mentality” overtakes the impulse to be the “good shepherd that leaves the ninety nine to seek one lost sheep that strayed.”

Moreover, Armenians and Armenian institutions, like other small peoples and institutions, can become trapped in their image within the majority culture, which has neither the time nor interest for things so peripheral and arcane. Indeed this image is more often of others’ making than our own, and often forged in extreme (usually negative) circumstances, e.g., Genocide, earthquake, Karabagh movement, Baku pogroms, terrorism, or political assassinations. In short, the imperative of ethnic identity with regard to the external majority non-Armenian culture often reinforces a “fixed menu mentality” which then carries over into Armenian-to-Armenian relations, resulting in a disconnect among Armenians over the pace of adaptation to new circumstances, often along the lines of majority culture vs. Armenian subculture.

Armenian ethnic identity is peripheral for most majority cultures (with the somewhat dated but notable exceptions in the Mid-East and to some extent in the Soviet space). In a similar way, in the course of one or two generations in dispersion, Armenian ethnic identity often becomes peripheral to the internal personality of individual dispersed Armenians. Such Diasporans develop a more integrated non-Armenian ethnic persona, again with certain, usually individual, exceptions that interferes with the code-switching required to feel at home in the “Fixed Menu” institutions of the organized community.
As generations pass from the Genocide dispersion to the present, the number of individual dispersed Armenians grow, while their tie to the organized community becomes more attenuated. The organized community has retained a small number of the successor generations, augmenting its menu in some ways to accommodate certain aspects of majority cultural, ethnic activism. But on the whole it continued to serve the fixed menu, largely developed by and for immigrants, to new waves of immigrants, rather than expanding, diluting or diversifying its menu to serve succeeding generations representing the large majority of Armenians. Since it is difficult to stay in the ill-defined, shifting and often small zone of common ground, most Armenians eventually withdraw into the majority culture, where they find more space and success, and if successful enough are re-embraced by the organized community to bolster the faint Armenian ethnic image in the majority culture.

1.2. The Silent Majority and the Institutional Vacuum in which They Live

A large majority of Armenians live outside the organized community in an institutional vacuum which provides little sustenance for Armenian identity. Dependence on family ties from one generation to the next is a fragile mechanism for cultural transmission. Ethnic identity quickly becomes strained in most cases. By the second or third generation for the vast majority of these children of immigrants, assimilation and intermarriage make being Armenian a matter of family memory, some foods, traditions, perhaps some linguistic or musical ties. Such Diasporans make occasional excursions into the ethnic milieu, usually in connection with family events where family members more active in organized community life draw others back episodically. Another touch point, which has increased with Armenia’s independence, is media attention to Armenian issues, putting these blips on the radar screen of majority culture. For example, the Karabagh movement or the earthquake gave Armenians otherwise unconnected with the organized community a window on Armenia through the majority culture’s mass media and institutions. Similarly, certain Armenia-related investment activities, professional associations, popular culture (e.g., films such as Ararat or rock bands such as System of a Down) or Armenian lobbying activities (e.g., Genocide recognition or assistance to Armenia) create a connection to Armenian things through majority culture activities, institutions and processes.

2. Homeland vs. Armenian State

For most pre-independence Diasporans, Soviet Armenia was not the homeland, but merely part of the homeland. Indeed, many Diasporans’ ties to a homeland lie in the historic Armenian Highlands west of Ararat and Lake Van, in Cilicia or the Black Sea coast. Moreover, Soviet Armenia was a homeland that endured (and was strongly shaped by) sovietization, often to the detriment of national, religious or political institutions and traditional heritage. Cold War attitudes and political machinations to undermine Armenian unity in certain Western communities compounded the alienation between Diasporans and the Armenian state. These attitudes toward Soviet Armenia carried over to some extent to the post-Soviet independent Republic of Armenia, in part because of underlying Western
Armenian-Eastern Armenian cultural differences rooted in the Ottoman, Russian and Persian Empires, but mostly because of the dominant overlay of Soviet and Russian culture on Armenian culture in the RA.

This alienation was further exacerbated by early RA policies and attitudes toward the Diaspora and Diasporans, which have, on occasion, been perceived as less than welcoming of Diasporans in Armenia. Specifically, the outright prohibition of dual citizenship in the Armenian Constitution (one of only 2 constitutions in the world to have such a provision – the other being Georgia), the banning of the ARF and imprisonment of its leaders in 1995, the statements of high-ranking RA Government Officials to the effect that the Armenian Diaspora has no role in Armenia except for sending money, the clash of cultures between the post-Soviet bureaucratic style and Western manners, democratic processes and transparency and Soviet Byzantinism, real and perceived corruption, the gap between the Armenia of Diasporans’ dreams and Armenia as it actually is, including its poverty, corruption, deindustrialization, depredated countryside, Soviet and Russian elements, de-Christianization; differences of language, dance, music and cuisine; and Soviet orthography, all contribute to Diasporans’ reluctance to embrace this Armenia as homeland, preserving that longing and emotional tie for a land that may only exist in their dreams or memories.

The several waves of Soviet emigration over the past 50 years have in general had a negative impact on Diasporan attitudes toward Armenia. Aside from the WWII refugee/defectors (Displaced Persons, DPs), who were relatively few and quickly melded into the existing Diasporan community, the repatriates (Nergaghtogh/aghbar) who went to Armenia during the 1940s-50s, as discussed further below, were one of the first identifiable emigrant waves from Soviet Armenia. They more often than not fled alien regimes where they had been subject to passive repression as second class citizens, only to face active persecution, rejection, banishment and state enemy status, in their “homeland” Armenia. For them, the dream was actually a nightmare with a tragic plot: “we went there with high hopes, as patriots, suffered horribly, were treated as sub-human by our own people, now hate everything ‘Armenian’ and just want to forget that horrible place.” Because they had a residual pre-Soviet cultural base, they found common ground with the existing Diasporan communities. Upon leaving, many came to the United States where their experience resonated with the Cold War antipathy to the Soviet Union and further challenged Diasporans’ residual tie to Armenia. Indeed, Diasporans were conflicted during the Cold War. For them the Soviet Union bore the human face of their relatives and the remnant of their homeland, which often made them balk at Cold War demonization. Nevertheless, there were voices from within the Armenian nation, in particular, the next wave of emigration from Armenia of the Soviet Union in the late 1970s and 1980s that reinforced the “evil empire” mental model of the 1980s.

Friction in the Diaspora between the older Diaspora and the new wave from Armenia continue to fuel a certain antipathy toward Armenia, especially with the latest post-Independence wave. Unlike earlier emigrants who had a residual pre-
Soviet cultural layer, this wave’s Soviet style and mentality, combined in some instances with unethical and criminal behavior as featured in the majority culture press, caused older Diasporans to distance themselves from emigres from Armenia and from Armenia itself. These kinds of behavior shook both the Armenian and American pillars of the Armenian-American image – (1) the idea that a free, independent Armenia was the “Armenian Dream” for which they had suffered the Genocide, exile, longing etc. and (2) their aspiration to be respected as good citizens, something they could never achieve in the Ottoman or Russian Empire, reinforced by the American dream of “rags to riches, or at least respectability” in the country that gave them refuge and opportunity after the Genocide.

In contrast, post-Soviet nihilistic behavior and the value system of some post-Independence emigrants were perceived by Armenian-Americans as blemishing the hard-earned, positive Armenian image, particularly in the United States. For the old Diaspora, Armenians’ ties to their land were axiomatic, a sacred trust – Armenians only “abandoned” historically Armenian lands if forced by a foreign power. The largely economic motivation of many of post-Independence emigrés conflicted with this bedrock value and the traditional aspiration to return to the homeland (depi yerkir). The negative attitude of new immigrants (often adopted as a justification for having broken the “sacred trust” with the land which they shared with the older Diasporans) further challenged the Diasporan “dream” of a free and independent Armenia.

The out-migration in the post-Soviet era, in short, produced a traumatized new Diaspora, burdened not only with the duty to support family and friends in Armenia, but also often with guilt for having left, sometimes with disgust toward all things Armenian, doubt about their new surroundings, and suspicion, if not hostility, from the old Diaspora. For both older Diasporans and the new emigrés, the illusion was shattered that once the “soviet regime was lifted away” Armenia would automatically become the Armenia of their dreams or idealized memories – prosperous, democratic, culturally Armenian, welcoming of all Armenians, magically rid of soviet feudalism, and for older Diasporans, Russian and other elements that were alien to the older Diasporan’s “homeland” culture.

The homeland/Armenia’s expectations and reactions to Diasporans in the post-Soviet era were similarly skewed. Diasporans were less forthcoming, often defensive, sometimes behaving like rich “know-it-all” cousins visiting and bossing their poorer relations around. In both groups, reactions led to anger, feelings of betrayal, abandonment, and defensiveness. As a result, it was easier to speak about Armenia-Diaspora relations than about Diaspora-Homeland relations, which implies that Diasporans should feel at home in Armenia and have a sense of entitlement to reclaim their homeland in Armenia.

3. Relationship

3.1. Modalities of Relationship

The relationships between Armenia and Diaspora are varied, but tend to the private, personalized, non-institutionalized, and non-consensus-building end of the
spectrum, where individuals and personalities take precedence over institutions and policies. Traditional hierarchies, often consisting of core constituencies from “fixed menu” institutions (benefactors and true believers), occupy and claim to be the voice of the Diaspora and to act as their representatives and emissaries. These patterns alienate non-conforming individuals and groups within the organized community and deepen the rift between the Silent Majority of Armenians and the organized community. These patterns militate against inclusive, community building, common understanding of Armenia’s future, and the institutionalization of consensus building in Armenian organized life.

Centuries of repression have built up a defensive mode of interaction that protects against total annihilation, but also impedes creative regeneration. Under-resourcing and risk aversion further reinforce a more open process, which, while perhaps more productive, is also inherently more costly, time consuming and unpredictable. When challenged, the organized community closes ranks. But by tightening the circle, fewer remain within that circle. In contrast, an open palm could hold more, but is more vulnerable than a clenched fist. Clutching to protect their niche means fewer and fewer have access to it. This stubborn pattern has been around for some time, but it is being moderated by the post-1970s generation, composed primarily of grandchildren of Genocide survivors, largely assimilated and born on foreign soil.

This new generation is beginning to forge ties between traditionally separate camps, while old rivalries have lost their emotional draw, and more realistic attitudes and a sense of urgency about Armenia are helping to overcome the resistance to openness and collaboration.

Nevertheless, there is frequent backsliding and atavistic behavior. And whenever one part of the community seeks to gain advantage over another through alliance with the majority culture at the expense of the whole, the ensuing divide-and-conquer policies usually leave the entire community weaker and more disaffected, as, for example, recently happened with the Armenian Assembly of America and the TARC initiative. Viewed by many as a usurpation of the voice of the community, even among those who generally support the idea of “second channel” diplomacy, the AAA misjudged the moment. Why the reaction? At least in part because the close affiliation and identification of key movers of this effort to an organization such as the AAA, self defined as “common and official voice” of all American Armenians, was viewed as something other than a simple “private citizens’ initiative.” Some saw this as an effort by the AAA to gain advantage over other groups -- in particular, their DC rival, the ANC -- in access and influence with the State Department, which actively encouraged and supported the AAA-affiliated individuals in a classic effort to fracture community consensus on geopolitically inconvenient items such as genocide recognition.

In the US and Europe, the post-70s generation is more assimilated to the majority culture where more open processes are the norm. It is also less scarred by the turf battles of the past. Over time, an older generation with strong personality-driven institutions has often been partially succeeded by individuals with lower profiles, since the old personalities continue to dominate, refusing to prepare and nurture
future leaders, and usually drive out those who have the ability or ambition to challenge them. Facing a dwindling constituency from the older Diaspora and unsure that they can win over the new Diaspora of Armenia, this new generation of leaders, no longer “bigger than life” personalities, appear more likely to move toward the majority culture style of institutional responsibility and policy-oriented decision-making. Moreover benefactors emerging from the new generation are largely unconnected with the older generation of strong personalities. It remains to be seen whether they will begin to “pay the piper and call the tune,” or whether they are committed enough to try to change or open up the culture of the organized community to rally interest and fortitude in the process of choosing to direct their reputations and resources toward a struggle for an endangered community and a small country. This will entail foregoing the easy pride, honor or stature available in the majority culture and global economic arena in order to take up the challenge of building Armenia into something remarkable.

3.2. Patterns of Human Interaction between Diaspora and Armenia - Tourism, Exchanges, Family Ties

Diverse patterns of interaction between the Diaspora and Armenia include tourism, exchange programs, family ties, and interaction between the new and old Diasporas. These are likely to continue and can be expanded considerably. Human interaction, including such programs as Armenia2020, that create a common space, new interest-based personal relationships, and interactions in better regulated milieus (such as exchange programs, summer camps, cultural events, sports, events, conferences) permit Armenians from both the Diaspora and Armenia to “check the baggage at the door” at least temporarily, while engaging in transcending pursuits, whether cultural, sports, food, study, religion, or professional discussions.

According to our survey results, Diasporans maintain ties to Armenia overwhelmingly through friends and family (86.4%) and through the internet (77.7%), that is, without intermediating public institutions. Social and cultural organizations (63%), newspapers (54%), and church (48%) are the institutional ties. Interestingly only about one in 5 maintains ties through business associates, schools and political parties. About 10% maintain no ties at all. Embassies were strikingly low at under 5% of all ties with Armenia. In short, Diasporans prefer private to public institutions to maintain ties with Armenia. It is not clear whether this preference is a cause or an effect of the weakness of public institutions, although, as might be expected in a post-modern, unconcentrated, but still tight-knit family-oriented sub-culture, there is more reliance on ad hoc personal ties than relations intermediated by institutions and media that may be viewed as biased or captured by a particular elite. The tendency to view institutions in this way is reinforced by the small social distance (usually only one or two degrees of distance) between members of the community and the elite.

Thus institutions are largely redundant, duplicating family and friend networks and therefore a bit artificial (why rely on second-hand info when you can get first-
The downside of this kind of communication network is that it is necessarily fragmented and places a great deal of responsibility on the recipient of information to check facts and assure balance. Since it is filtered through individual as opposed to a communal or market-disciplined lens, rumor and partisan perceptions tend to displace news and facts. It also bypasses the institutional structure that would otherwise encourage people to sort out their varying perspectives and differences. Also, since the info is delivered informally or in the case of the internet and newspapers by very under-resourced institutions, the quality of what is delivered through these channels is often quite uneven. This is in part a consequence of market failure, in that the market for high-quality information about Armenia is not sufficient to attract the talent and resources to produce high-quality, balanced, thoughtful information, including, in particular, international media outlets. Reporters do not have the time or justification for really understanding what is happening in Armenia, so they resort to regional stereotypes or shoehorning Armenian facts into hackneyed story lines. This in turn finds its way into the unmediated internet, where under-resourced news agencies clone each others’ stories, perhaps adding a few new facts, indistinguishable from opinions, as their “value added” and as their means of avoiding accusations of plagiarism. The result is something of a “hearsay world of gossip masquerading as news reverberating in a very distortive cave.”

Often Diasporans feel incompetent to deal with Armenia because of linguistic or other cultural barriers; however, professional milieus neutralize this “ethnic know-how” factor and move their relations into a more equal zone of competence and comfort. Since the relationship between the Diaspora and Armenia is at least in one sense the aggregate of such interactions, the more of these that are positive or play into the competence of the participants, the more the overall relationship will be viewed as positive. On the other hand, when such interactions are negative, even if they are episodic, (e.g., a conference where discussions got out of hand or a few unpleasant exchanges took place), these can cause a substantial setback for Diaspora-Armenia relations.

Finally, we should not forget that a good portion of Armenia-Diaspora human interactions are based on migration, mostly emigration from Armenia, although the opposite population flow, repatriation has also played an important role in Armenia-Diaspora human relations. The brain-drain from Armenia has been a centuries long process, that picked up momentum in the 19th century to Europe and Russia, and accelerated through the Soviet era to Moscow, reaching new levels after independence, when new freedom and opportunities for travel combined with limited career prospects in Armenia’s transition economy, fueled emigration. The opposite flow, repatriation, was a tragic page in Diaspora-Armenian relations, which still strains relations on an inter-personal level.

3.3. Economic Relations between Diaspora and Armenia – Charity, Consumption, Direct vs. Indirect investment, Support for Culture, Conferences

There are five basic Diasporan cash flows to Armenia –
• direct investment
• indirect investment
• directing third-party contracts to Armenia
• remittances-charity
• consumption

Investment, primarily direct investment, has been the main emphasis for Diasporan involvement in economic development over the past decade. For the reasons discussed below, this is the cash flow that presents the greatest risk and demands the most time and commitment. Yet this is the cash flow that has been the focus of most economic development discourse.

Diasporans are no different from other investors. They carefully assess the kinds of investments they are suited to make. For some, foreign direct investment may be appropriate. For many, foreign direct investment in an emerging economy is terra incognita. Investing in Armenia is perhaps more difficult for Diasporans because it seems more familiar than it really is. A happy investment is the matching of expectations with reality.

Indirect, passive investment through some kind of managed fund may be better suited to the risk-profile, time, and information constraints of most Diasporans. Creating one or more investment funds is long overdue. Diasporans may want to follow the lead of Armenia’s major benefactors today and consider being financial investors in longer-term, lower-risk infrastructure investments in areas of strategic importance to Armenia’s development: for example, opportunities today abound in telecom, electricity and other utilities, and transportation, as well as long-term financing of schools, hospitals, cultural institutions, public works and conservation projects. Even if the economy picks up, these public goods and services are not likely to have adequate funding in the near future.

One of the most most-effective and high impact investments Diasporans should consider is funding other Diasporans to live and work in Armenia, whether as volunteers, students, tourists, repatriates or retirees, as an efficient way of bringing skills with a built in multiplier effect on the economy, implicitly transferring not only wealth, but also technical know how and globally competitive attitudes to Armenia.

A new trend emerging today is a move from commercial investment to consumption. Diasporan retirement and part-time living in Armenia is on the rise, as is substantial growth in the tourism and education sectors. As Armenia produces more goods that are attractive to Diasporans, this market will respond by substituting Armenia-origin goods and services. The ethnic and nostalgic factors of Armenian branded goods and services (including spirits, cheese, food, music, etc.) are finding a strong new market among the new Diaspora from Armenia, whose buying power is growing along with yearning for the homeland, as negative attitudes fade and evolve.
In fact, consumption is likely to displace charity in cash flow to Armenia as the Armenian economy picks up, mitigating economic hardship as donor fatigue sets in among the new Diasporans. They may have been willing to support parents or siblings, but are not likely to support nephews, nieces and cousins for another generation.

As more investment comes into Armenia from non-Armenian sources, Armenians may feel less compelled to be investors in the real economy, preferring to direct the nation’s resources to those aspects of traditional national life that are endangered or constantly in need of subsidy – namely, language and culture. Armenia has not become so attractive a destination for investment that investors, among them Armenian investors, would prefer to invest in Armenia over other countries. So until the investment climate in the country becomes more competitive and more attractive than other countries, the main reason for Armenians to invest in Armenia is to build the country and reap economic and psychic rewards from this investment.

3.4. East is East and West is West?

For all the poetic images about differences in culture – two languages like two flowers, one more beautiful than the other – the reality is that cultural differences are a source of friction among Armenians. Because all Armenian culture is endangered in some way, even in Armenia by global and Russian culture, there is at least an unconscious, and in some cases, conscious chauvinism about Armenian culture, which, of course, is the Armenian culture borne by this or that individual Armenian.

The main divide is now RA- post-Soviet culture and the rest, so it is not primarily modern dialects – Eastern vs. Western Armenian. Indeed, the soviet orthography vs. classical orthography divide is often more pronounced than any dialect different. Nevertheless, there are gradations of friction, and not surprisingly, Iranian Armenians who are closest geographically, linguistically, and culturally have an easier time of making a connection with Armenia than other Diasporans, although sometimes familiarity is deceiving and breeds contempt. Also the Soviet and Russian overlay vs. the Ottoman, Arabic, Iranian, French, English, etc. overlays which stop short of creating pidgin or creole subcultures and dialects, nevertheless, create friction. Cuisine too is largely regional and Armenians in addition to their other differences have absorbed many culinary characteristics from host cultures. RA cuisine seems quite soviet and Russian to Western Armenians, just as Lebanese-Armenian cuisine seems quite Arabic to RA Armenians. The same can be said of music, modes of interaction, manners and politeness, etc. While contact is gradually creating multi-cultural Armenians who are overcoming the initial impulse of rejection and becoming conversant and comfortable with a range of Armenian subcultures, these are still the exception rather than the norm. For many Diasporans, Armenia is a place of “self-estrangement” where expecting to meet
their own, they find an alien culture that is deceptively, but superficially similar (e.g., the same alphabet, but different spelling; similar music, but different dances).

One of the most striking differences between Diaspora and homeland is Christianity and religiosity. For Diasporans, the Church continued in its role as the surrogate state, the gathering place of the people (which is literally what yekeghetsi – from Greek ecclesia, based on Hebrew synagogue, which means literally, “leading together”). Even for the non-religious and those critical of the Church, the Church is cherished as a traditional value and definitional; there are few militantly atheistic Diasporans. The non-centrality of the church to Armenian life in Armenia is therefore striking for Diasporans haling from outside the Soviet space.

The situation in Russia, for example, in Moscow, as one might suspect, is closer to the situation and attitude in Armenia. Until recently, with only a small cemetery chapel to serve a community of tens if not hundreds of thousands, the church could not be a gathering place or play a central role in Armenian life. Despite pride about the historic fact that Armenia was the first nation to adopt Christianity as a state religion, ethnic identity for Armenians in the Soviet Union was largely secularized and often antipathetic to Christianity; whereas the religious strand of ethnic identity in other Diasporan communities is an essential and living part of their identity, e.g., the Mid-East, where Muslim/non-Muslim religious distinctions have political significance in the host country, or in Europe, the US and South America, where the general culture has absorbed Christianity, through which many Diasporans draw their Christian beliefs.

After the 1700\textsuperscript{th} Celebrations, the opening of the new Cathedral in Yerevan, re-activation of many churches and establishment of many parishes throughout Armenia, the beginnings of Christian community life are observable, but not the salient or thorough-going feature of Armenian identity in Armenia that they are for the Diasporans outside of the former Soviet space.

3.5. Repatriation – Bad Legacy of Repatriation during the Soviet Period

While most of the focus in recent years has been on emigration from Armenia and accounts for most of the immediate contact between Armenians from Armenia and Diasporas, immigration by Diasporans to Armenia has also been a constant source of interaction and, often friction, between Armenians. From the 19\textsuperscript{th} century depi yerkir movement of Westernizing or Russifying intellectuals to the mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century return to Armenia of Armenians from Europe, the Middle East and America, the longing and sense of responsibility for the homeland has been a dominant theme in the ideology, if not practice of Diasporans. Diasporan communities were sustained, in part, by the dream of returning to the land from which their ancestors were exiled. That dream has a strand of entitlement borne of the hardships of exile and oppression, which is often met by resentment by those Armenians who have endured similar hardships and injustices on the land. The neediness of both for comfort and the inability of both to overcome old pain has often led to an insensitivity toward the other and lack of tolerance of the other. The two wounded parts of the nation, their energies still consumed in tending their own wounds, are
often unable to transcend these, being transformed into “wounded healers,” each of the other. So when somewhat idealistic, left-leaning, pro-Soviet Diasporans heeded the call to return to the homeland in the 20s and again, and especially in the 40s and 50s, instead of embrace and welcome, they felt and were treated as “strangers in a strange land,” often ruthlessly persecuted and meanly ridiculed. Indeed, until the mid-1990s, this “akhbar-intolerance” was quite widespread in Armenia, fueled at least in part by great power “divide and conquer” politics and the mentality and interests of Armenia’s powerbrokers immediately after 1991 independence.

As Armenia opened up, the xenophobic strand of this intolerance receded through contact with so many foreigners after the earthquake and through assistance programs. That so many Armenians had emigrated and now were part of the “akhbar” Diaspora also broke down these barriers. The discontent and negativity of the new wave of emigrés from Armenia and the stories of their predecessors, largely children of 1940s repatriates, has produced a legacy of bitterness toward the idea of repatriation. Nevertheless, some of the new émigrés are returning, either tired of living in otarutyun or sufficiently successful economically to see return to Armenia as, on balance, a way to a better quality of life for themselves and their families. In much smaller numbers the older Diasporans, some with international experience and part of the international expat population and others more for individual reasons, are coming back to Armenia to live and work.

3.6. Attitudes of Diaspora toward Armenia, Armenia toward Diaspora, Attitudes of Others toward Both, Attitudes of Various Diasporan Communities toward Each Other

Diasporan attitudes toward Armenia, and Armenia’s attitudes toward the Diaspora are complex and evolving rapidly. They are largely a product of media images, anecdotes and hear-say, rather than direct experience or cognitive processes. See, for example, the negative images that have surfaced in 2003 in American majority culture (mainstream national broadcasting), portraying Armenians as vengeful police killers with reference to the way we handled things in the “old country” (a substitution of Armenians into the Italian mafia stereotype) in Hack, as an Armenian mob or Mafia in LA headed by an Armenian named Anatoly in Dragnet, and as an object of mockery, low culture in the popular sitcom Friends.

Armenia 2020 Survey results show that Armenians in Armenia view the Diaspora as an asset that is under-engaged. In general Armenians in Armenia have a more positive view of the contribution of Diasporans than Diasporan views of their own contribution to Armenia’s development to date.
Attitudes of others toward Armenia and Armenians play an important role in the attitudes of Diasporans toward Armenia. When there is bad or unsympathetic news in the majority culture about Armenians or Armenia, Diasporans sometimes take offense at the negative image, either blaming the majority culture for misperceptions or blaming Armenia or Armenians for having earned a bad reputations or both. Either case makes Armenian identity more burdensome for Diasporans than when Armenians are either unknown or have a positive image. In general, this proves the maxim that “good news isn’t news,” negative news has more impact than positive. Thus, for example, when there is an assassination or report of corruption from Armenia, Diasporan attitudes toward Armenia and Armenians from Armenia are harmed more than it is improved by correspondingly important good news from Armenia. Similarly, reports of criminal or unethical behavior among Armenians from Armenia in Los Angeles, for example, not only shape old Diasporan attitudes toward the new Diaspora from Armenia, but also feed negative attitudes toward Armenia in general.

Attitudes among Diasporans in different communities and origins also play a significant if decreasing role in Diasporan and national cohesiveness. While there are exceptions, for most second- and third-generation Diasporans identification with and affinity for their region or village of origin and compatriots from those places is relatively attenuated, a quaint vestigial memory, but not an active factor in their personal identity or social interactions with other Armenians. Aside from individual and family-based exceptions, several key cultural lines distinguish Western and Eastern Armenians, particularly, Genocide-Diasporans from Armenians hailing from Iran, and among Western Armenians between Constantinople and the provinces, Genocide Diasporans who came directly to Europe and the Americas, and those who established Mid-Eastern Communities, where the Christian-Muslim distinction continued to shape and preserve the millet (ethnic ghetto) mentality and community structure of the former Ottoman Empire.

The melting pot mentality of Europe and the United States (and to a lesser degree the Canadian “patchwork quilt” version of the melting pot) and the ethnic ghetto mentality are still competing mental models for community organization and color attitudes of Diasporan groups and individuals based on their provenance. With the generation change currently underway, where most community leaders of the first generation born in the Diaspora are reaching retirement, the distinctions are fading and losing relevance, since the pace of assimilation and global homogenization have accelerated to such a degree that except for the emigrating generation, second and succeeding generations in Diaspora in a single country are more like each other, regardless of origin, than they are like their emigrating ancestors.

In short, third generation Armenian-Americans whose ancestors were western Armenians from the Genocide and second and, often first generation, Armenian-Americans, whose emigrating ancestors were from Egypt, Lebanon, Iran, Jerusalem or Turkey, are often indistinguishable in their majority culture persona and are generally on a path toward convergence in their Armenian persona.
4. Sub-Groups

4.1. Religious Affiliation - Armenian Apostolic, Armenian Catholic, Russian Orthodox, Armenian Evangelical Protestant, other non-Armenian Christians, Believer, Agnostic, Non-Believer

Religious affiliation is another centrifugal force on the Diaspora, where diversity of religious affiliation and the place of religion generally is significantly different from Armenia. According to Armenia 2020 Survey Results, although Armenians in Armenia rank being Christian as the second most important characteristic of Armenian identity, Diasporans tend to go to church slightly more often than Armenians in Armenia. This might be explain in part by the fact that, as understood by both Diasporans and Armenians in Armenia, the church plays the role of ethnic, cultural and spiritual center in the Diaspora, whereas in Armenia, since other institutions, including the state, play these roles, the church is viewed more specifically as a national unifier and teacher of morality. The role of spiritual center is important, although ranked lower perhaps because it was so suppressed during the soviet era. Thus, Armenians in Armenia view the church almost equally as a teacher of morals and ethics (57.9%) and unifier of Armenians worldwide (57.9%), whereas Diasporans see the church as spiritual center of society (61%), teacher of morals and ethics (49.5), and keeper of cultural and linguistic heritage (41%), and only then as a unifier of Armenians worldwide (30%).

While the church with its international network and membership could function as a unifying pan-national institution, 2 out of 3 Diasporans do not view this as one of the church’s top 2 functions. This result is consistent with the Diasporan’s de-emphasis of institutional affiliation as their primary tie to Armenia and may also reflect the divisive history of the church and clergy in the Etchmiadzin-Antelias rivalry in America, which some Diasporans could view as disqualifying the church for the role of unifying shepherd of the nation.

While there are some differences between those whose Diasporan identity was formed in the Muslim-Christian millet or post-millet communities of the Mid-East and those whose Diasporan identity was formed in basically Christianity milieus of Europe and the Americas, the fault line on religion is largely between the more Church-centered Diaspora, for whom the church continues to play its historical role of surrogate state, and Armenia, where the Church is still marginalized by the Soviet anti-church and anti-religion policies and propaganda. For most Diasporans there is no conflict between being well educated, modern and scientific and being a believer. For most Armenians in and from Armenian these characteristics remain incompatible. The category of believer and faith have negative to neutral connotations in the Armenia milieu, whereas they are generally in the neutral to positive range in the Diaspora. The diversity of the Diasporan environment has given rise to intermarriage and the prevailing attitude in many
secularizing modern societies that religion is a matter of personal choice and personal satisfaction, have lead to a wider variety of affiliations.

In the long run, the prevailing global trend toward secularization is setting the stage for Diaspora and Armenia to converge on marginalized religion and church. In the meantime, these differences in attitudes toward religion and church may be a source of friction, with the Church in Armenia attempting to reassert itself in a way that may be appropriate for the mono-ethnic population of Armenia, but not for the more diverse Diasporan communities, for whom the policies and character of the Church and clergy in Armenia may be inconsistent with their view of Christianity informed by the global Christian milieu in which they live, which could translate into Diasporan transference of negative attitudes toward the Church in Armenia to Armenia itself.

The division and rivalry in the Church between Etchmiadzin and Antelias, which has an impact on all Armenian Christians, has an added dimension in North America where parallel structures have served a divided community for over 50 years. While the division is of Genocide-survivor generation origin (1933), it was detonated by soviet divide-and-conquer policies and the hobbling of Etchmiadzin during the 1930’s and 1940’s. In 1956, to address the needs of a large portion of the Armenian community that was without pastors or churches and unwelcome in churches constituting the Diocese, the Prelacy of the Armenian Church was formed and aligned with the Great House of Cilicia (successor to the Catholicate of Sis).

Decline in parishioners and economic pressures are emerging as a factor driving toward unification. Decline in parishioners is part of the global trend toward secularization and generation change and the failure of the church to keep pace with changes in the profile of the parish. There is the risk, however, that as these institutions become less important to the mainstream Armenia, the hard core will hold on more tightly, for any of a number of reasons, including their instinct to protect the institution from changes they view as undesirable as well as issues of power and personal position. Failure to resolve this issue adds to the friction between Armenia and the Diaspora, and fragmentation among Armenians. It also reinforces a self-image of divisiveness that many Armenians find repelling and inconsistent with their Armenian and Christian values. Ultimately, it could drive Armenians to seek refuge in larger, better organized churches, leaving the “fixed menu” core of both institutions to skirmish over turf. But this situation is not just a risk. It is also an opportunity to establish new models of communal interaction and cooperation. The manner in which the Church and Diasporans resolve this division in the church could be a microcosm of the larger effort to create cooperation within the Armenian nation as a whole.

4.2. Post-Genocide & Cold-War Legacy

4.2.1. Inner Diaspora (within the CIS vs. outside the CIS), Residual Cold War Mentality

The “inner Diaspora,” originally in the Soviet Union and to some extent in East Europe, and now mainly in Russia, had somewhat closer ties to Armenia and easier access. Indeed, during the Soviet period, many people
in the inner Diaspora did not consider themselves Diasporans, even though the processes of assimilation to the majority culture and intermarriage were evident. Because current-day Armenia, during the post-1813 through the Soviet period, was and continues to be part of the Russian culture space, Armenian-Russian bi-culturalism in part accounts for the comfort level that Armenians from Armenia feel in this setting. At a deeper level, there may be shared values from Eastern Christendom and a geopolitical world view, especially with regard to the Turkic element in Eurasia. Russia, in particular, Moscow, is being globalized more rapidly than Armenia, and Armenia may undergo “second-hand” globalization through Russia with delays and distortions of the Russian medium, alongside its direct access to global culture, in particular through the external Diaspora. In line with the long-observed patterns of cultural diffusion theory, as a peripheral part of the Russian cultural space, it is more likely to be conservative or to lag behind Moscow, for example, in adopting innovations in Russian culture. Because of the greater affinity between inner Diaspora culture and Armenia’s culture, Armenia is more likely to be receptive to the inner Diaspora and its culture. On the other hand, contact and interaction with the more heterogeneous external Diaspora could accelerate modernization and global values. The inner Diaspora outside of Russia is more problematic. In other parts of Russia, e.g., Krasnodar, where there have been traditional communities and large concentrations of Armenians in the past, now Armenians are integrating into the local political structures and giving it an ethnic hue at the sufferance of the majority Russian culture. The fate of the Armenian communities in Georgia is yet more precarious. If Armenia were to adopt a “protection of its nationals abroad” policy with regard to these communities, as it has with Artsakh, these Diasporan communities could draw Armenia into conflict with its neighbors at a geopolitical flashpoint between Russian and American interests. Viewed as a market, the inner Diaspora is closer and a natural entry point into the Russian/CIS market. However, the buying power of this market is smaller and its tastes are less demanding than the external Diasporan market. In short, the inner Diaspora and its influence on Armenia’s culture and foreign policy continue to make US-Russian relations an important fissure for Armenia’s future development and relationship with the external Diaspora.

4.2.2. External Diaspora – Relationships and Diverse Cultures of Armenian Communities and Hyphenated Armenians - Europe, Mid-East, Turkey, Australia, South America Communities

The varieties of multiculturalism in the external Diaspora are at once a very rich and unique resource and an obstacle to understanding between the external Diaspora and Armenia. To relate equally well to the sheer variety of cultural types would demand extraordinary versatility and cultural tolerance that is difficult to acquire, even in the best of circumstances. And
for Armenia, just emerging from the relatively homogenized and isolated 
Soviet culture, it has been bewildering. The difficulty of this task is perhaps 
most vividly seen by viewing this relationship from the other end of the 
equation: the difficulty that external Diasporans have in dealing with the 
relatively uniform culture of post-independence Armenia.

As noted above the relatively heterogeneous nature of the external Diaspora 
could be a spur to more rapid global integration than if Armenia were left on 
its own or to continue to relate globally through the CIS or Russia. 
However, for the most part, the Armenian component of the post-Genocide 
Diaspora is not robust enough to reengage with Armenia directly.

4.3. **New Diaspora (from Armenia) vs. Old Diaspora**

For generations Armenian Diasporan communities and organizations have been 
the receptacles of waves of refugees and émigrés, from the Ottoman Empire 
before and after the Genocide, then from the Middle East (from various sources, 
Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iran), then from Soviet Armenia, and in the last decade 
from Armenia itself. Particularly in America and Europe, Diasporan 
institutions, rather than growing and adapting to the established, assimilating 
and assimilated second and third generation Diasporans, have made a priority of 
attending to the needs of the often Armenian-speaking émigrés, with more 
marked Armenian ethnicity (Armenian-educated or Armenian-speaking), 
viewing them as a blood transfusion into the anemic mainstream.

In the Mid-East and the inner Diaspora of the Soviet Union and CIS, the 
situation has been somewhat different. Many of the Mid-East communities are 
dwindling or severely endangered (e.g., Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, Jerusalem). 
The CIS communities like the US and European communities are stratified, 
with more established Diasporan Armenians more assimilated, intermarried and 
having less to do with the newest wave of Armenian émigrés from Armenia. 
For Armenian communities outside the Soviet and former Soviet space the 
church has been the primary gathering place.

For the Soviet “inner Diaspora,”” access to Armenia and family, economic, 
social and cultural ties to Armenia, plus identification of many citizens of the 
former Soviet Union with the USSR as homeland, created a different mental 
model, for these Armenians, many of whom did not consider themselves in 
“Diaspora” or outside of their “homeland.” With independence, the political 
and social ties, plus the negative feelings of emigrating from Armenia due to 
hardships (lack of economic and career opportunities) have begun to create a 
more classic Diasporan mentality among some Armenians in Russia, for 
example. However, for many, residual biculturalism (Armenian-Russian) does 
not make them feel like a “stranger in a strange land,” with the corresponding 
longing that is one of the distinctive characteristics of earlier “classic” 
Diasporan/refugee/exile experience.
4.4. Eastern vs. Western Armenian Language and Subcultures

The diverse pre-19th century spectrum of localized Armenian cultures that may have permitted a kind of fluid intermingling into a common Armenian culture was displaced by the more rigid, bureaucratically enforced standardized Eastern and Western Armenian cultures in the 20th century. This masks the reality, already noted, that much of Armenia’s Eastern Armenian populations have Western Armenian roots. It also masks the substantive similarities and common Western Armenian roots of many Persian Armenians (Parskahays). The Eastern and Western Armenian language and subcultures, while converging through contact, intermarriage, interaction and dilution in global culture, can still be divisive. These differences are a stumbling block at both ends of the cultural and linguistic retention spectrum. At one extreme of the spectrum are those who are deeply and exclusively rooted in one or the other culture and react somewhat negatively, even chauvinistically, toward the other, often in response to the other’s chauvinistic attitudes. At the other extreme are those whose residual familiarity with Armenian culture has faded or become calcified, so they simply lack the cultural versatility to relate to or understand the other Armenian subculture.

As both are at risk, but particularly the Western Armenian subculture, the bearers of this culture are more tenacious, inflexible and averse to accommodating an Eastern Armenian culture which is more likely to obliterate than to absorb and preserve Western Armenian culture. Moreover, each of these subcultures has a distinctive bi- and multi-cultural overlay that deepened and hardened both the underlying differences in Eastern and Western Armenian subcultures, like an amalgam. The Western Armenian ties to Europe also feed a more individualist, democratic value system rooted in the Enlightenment, whereas the Eastern Armenian ties to Russia tend toward communitarian, hierarchichal, feudal value systems.

Both have been further hardened by the bureaucratic rationalism of industrial modernity, with its dehumanizing affects. Thus the Russian and to a lesser degree Persian influence on the modern Eastern language and culture and the Turkish, French, and English influence on Modern Western culture have made each less intelligible and acceptable to the other. Moreover, the Soviet overlay on Eastern Armenian sub-culture has created a split in Eastern Armenian culture and language, but as the basis for the Republic of Armenia’s culture, has given this sub-culture dominance and advantage, even though it has many features that are not accepted or shared with the non-Soviet Eastern and the Western sub-cultures and languages.

Perhaps the most controversial and salient example is the Soviet version of the Armenian alphabet, which was changed twice, once in 1922 and again in 1940. As a result, even rudimentary sharing and searching of text files is not possible between Eastern and Western Armenian cultures and the common classical culture of both of these sub-cultures. Pursuant to this policy, Western Armenians are required to change the spelling of their names for RA official documents (e.g., contracts, registrations and ten-year passports) and documents...
in Classical Orthography and Western Armenian are not accepted by government offices. While different people draw different conclusions from this policy -- some see it as essentially defense of standard RA Armenian, while others a continuation of the Ottoman and Soviet policies aimed at obliterating the classic structure of the Mesropian writing system -- Western Armenian and Classical Armenian and/or sowing divisions among the Armenian people.

4.5. The Role of the Causes Underlying Dispersion on the Diasporan Mentality-Genocide, Economic Emigration, Political Persecution

While cultural identity has both diachronic and synchronic axes, for Diasporans the diachronic tie to ancestors is usually dominant, especially for the Genocide survivors and their successors. As noted earlier, for the old Diaspora, the Soviet emigration from persecution, like the emigration from the war-torn Middle East, was more like their own exile and deportation, than the economic reasons for the new wave of emigration from free, independent Armenia. This economic emigration challenged the fundamental value system of the old Diaspora.

4.6. Centrifugal vs. Centripetal forces, Convergences, Divergences, Hybrids

Internalized Multiculturalism

The cultural diversity of the Armenian nation continues to be a centrifugal force among Armenians. Fault lines, such as the East-West subcultures, the Soviet/Russian and European and Mid-Eastern overlays, and the residual bipolarism of the Armenia-Diaspora relationship can be divisive. The Russian-US (old Cold War fracture) could revert to bipolarism over such issues as nuclear weapons in Iran or US oil interests in the Caucasus, resulting in an estrangement not only of the old Diaspora from Armenia, but also of the new Diaspora from its siblings and immediate families in Armenia.

The democratic values and relative economic well-being of the external Diasporans is also a possible wedge between the Armenia and the Diaspora, and between the inner and the external Diaspora. In a more complex way, Armenia itself could become cross-polarized with Armenia’s westernizing sub-culture looking to the Western Diaspora and the more Russia/Soviet sub-culture looking to Russia. To a certain extent the earlier pre-19th century fluidity in Armenian culture has ossified to the point that in the 20th century Diaspora and Armenia have become hybrids, divergent offshoots from a common culture pool. Those members of each which do not have sufficient contact with the other do not develop the versatility to handle both hybrids and therefore in the best case there is friction and worst case rejection, when there is not enough counterbalancing commonality of “Armenian” identity. This is particularly true of those Armenians who have internalized their hybrid Armenian identity in a vestigial, almost fossilized way, such that this inner identity interferes with the individual’s ability to augment his or her Armenian cultural versatility or agility. Such vestigial identity is common in the successors of the Genocide Diasporans, who do not have enough proficiency in Armenian culture or the time or interest to develop it to be able to acquire or accept a broader Armenian identity. Armenia, on the other hand, as it has emerged from the isolation of the Soviet era, has changed of necessity, since the earthquake.
developed a more versatile receptivity that permits Armenians in Armenia to deal with the diversity of cultures.

Initially, perhaps the similarities between Diasporans and Armenians create a false sense of solidarity and familiarity. The superficial similarities between Armenians in and out of Armenia, masking deeper differences have resulted in considerable, and often unpleasant, miscommunication and such pique as only people who are too similar can cause each other. Predictably, the pendulum swung in the other direction, over-emphasizing differences, without giving common traits, values and interests their due. As of this writing in the spring of 2003, this seems to be finding a new, if precarious, equilibrium, which each more flexible, less suspicious, and more forward looking. It is fragile, and following the law of small, tight knit societies, individual missteps that would not ordinarily register in a larger society, can create a reputation or leave a bad impression.

4.7. Blurring of Old Boundaries, Emergence of New Faults along Cultural Lines, New Alignments, Cross-cutting Institutions and Individuals

Armenian culture in general is now awash in global culture, which is eroding not only the inherited divisions, but endangering the culture itself. Indeed, both by creating a new layer of common culture where Armenians of different background interact, and by imposing a de facto multiculturalism, old boundaries are fading away. The convergence of Russian and European/Western Culture is accelerating the process, although as noted above, Armenia as a peripheral region of the Russian cultural space is likely to absorb Western culture via Russia with a good deal of delay. The accelerator is direct Armenian contact with Western cultures.

Diasporans, old and new, along with the media, tourists and foreign investors, are the vectors of this kind of change. If Armenia moves west faster than Russia, which is entirely possible, given the Diaspora and Armenia’s small size, then there is the risk of a new fault line within Armenia itself. Similarly, if Armenia does not progress fast enough toward Western standards of democracy, openness, and Christian values to which the Diaspora is accustomed, then this inherited fault line could be reinforced. Then, with the passing of generations, the proclivity to seek common ground as Armenians might fade away entirely, leaving today’s old and new Diasporas to become lost tribes.

The dangers of incompatible paces of change are very high. Most of the Diaspora is in the central current of global change. The new Diasporans from Armenia are assimilating, even in the ghettoized communities, much more rapidly than previous generations, under the general acceleration of cultural diffusion, if for no other reason. This difference in the axis of time may be one of the most difficult to overcome, since the half-life of a Diasporan is growing shorter and shorter and they may not have the energy or patience to wait for Armenia to catch up while living their lives at a different pace in the currents of global culture.

5. Micro Issues - Individual Identity Issues

5.1. Typical Life-Cycle/Patterns of a Diasporan Individual/Family
As the individual and family are the fundamental bearers of a culture, especially in the Diaspora, it is important to consider how individual development, careers, inter-generational relations and the family are changing in the Diaspora. The emigrating generation is transitional, but the transition period is much shorter now than for the Genocide generation or even intermediate emigrants from the Middle East. With notable exceptions, the Genocide generation emigrants were often orphaned children and refugees who came from villages without globally marketable skills, often little schooling or foreign languages. Strong community religious, civic and political organizations became their nurturers during their acculturation to their new country (paying dividends to organizations to this day in the form of loyalty and support).

The newer waves of emigration had more education, often both Armenian and English, French or Russian, and had globally marketable skills in engineering, medicine, or international trade, and emigrated during the faster paced, post WWII period of accelerated assimilation. While Armenian families still tend to have closer ties both within the nuclear family, across generations, and to the extended family, by the third and increasingly the second generation in the Diaspora, they tend to converge with the majority cultures, where mobility and individualism have superseded family ties. Thus, the patterns of intergenerational transmission of culture and sense of belonging and identity as Armenians are converging with the more individualistic trends of global culture.

However, there have been and are significant counter-examples of families who are active in Diasporan institutions, who speak only or primarily Armenian with their children and/or who emphasize Armenian identity, even in the third generation in the Diaspora. In some cases, such Armenian enrichment is positive and productive, in others it leads to a kind of overkill or alienation and rejection by the younger generation. To some extent this depends on how the individual resolves the tension between vertical, inter-generational ties with family and horizontal, co-generational ties with friends and the majority culture.

5.2. Tension between Self-Actualization and Ethnic Identity

For many Armenians, living in the community, particularly, living in Armenia creates tension between self-actualization and ethnic identity. Modernization and homogenization and the creation of the global labor market, emphasize individual achievement over group welfare and duty to community, and urge adoption of income, status and career achievement as objective measures of happiness and fulfillment. Because of its relatively small size and under-integration into the global economy, Armenia has not yet developed many kinds of professional activity and industries, etc. are not developed to the point of absorbing the available talent and educated labor pool. Indeed, the economy has not recovered from transition fast enough to permit people to make a living wage, let alone developing a career. Thus, instead of importing jobs, Armenia exports workers in search of economic security and self-actualization.

From a certain perspective, Armenia provides the best environment for self-actualization for an individual as an Armenian, to take part in the building of a
homeland at a historic period in the nation’s history, to live in an Armenian
cultural and political milieu where Armenians govern themselves, as opposed to
being guests in another’s house. Moreover, the problems of this small,
underdeveloped territory, depredated for centuries, will challenge even the most
talented, educated and dedicated individuals to maximize the use of their
intellect and resourcefulness. However, most individuals also view such
individual career and self-actualization issues from a market perspective, which
cannot put a value on historic opportunity, cultural milieu and governing
oneself. Therefore, the economic and rational factors often outweigh national
identity. Applying the Armenian version of the Protestant work-ethic,
Armenians often use wealth as a short hand for virtue and leadership ability in
the community, sometimes leaving the impression that the leadership of the
community is for sale and reinforces the tendency toward individual economic-
self-actualization to the exclusion of communal well-being.

At present, for many Armenians Armenia does not offer the opportunity for
self-actualization, broadly or economically defined, and for some, it has actually
been a negative environment from which they sought to escape. The effort,
time, resources, and sacrifices of building a globally competitive economy and
living milieu are a great task.

One common pattern of career path and community engagement is to attempt to
achieve personal success, and then turn to communal matters. This approach
highlights the disconnect between personal and national goals of well-being.
Whether or when Armenians will reach the level of personal security necessary
to undertake the task of building a satisfactory homeland remains an open
question.

5.3. Intermarriage, Assimilation

Intermarriage and assimilation are a fracture line between Diaspora and
Armenia. Although intermarriage happened on occasion in Armenia, because
of Armenia’s mono-ethnicity, intermarriage was far less common and absorbed
more readily than in the Diaspora. With the appearance of significant numbers
of non-Armenian foreigners in Armenia, who represent the opportunity for
emigration, different family and personal values, etc. Intermarriage has
increased and is accelerating. While intermarriage does not always accelerate
assimilation, it usually does. There is a growing counter-trend of non-Armenian
spouses who adopt Armenian culture and identity, embracing it for their family
and enhancing the community of which they became a part. Overall, however,
assimilation is more evident in the Diaspora than in Armenia; it is a factor
leading to divergence. In an inversion of this situation, for some Diasporans,
Armenia seems highly assimilated into a Soviet/Russian, perhaps global pop-
culture or Mid-Eastern society that is not authentically Armenian.
5.4. Positive Armenia/Armenian Image: Reputation Incentive to Identify as Armenian

Ethnic pride plays a role in Armenia-Diaspora relations. To the extent that Armenia and Armenians have a positive image, Diasporans are prone to value and emphasize this aspect of their identity. On the contrary, to the extent that these are negative, they have less incentive to do so. Experience has shown that once lost, ethnic pride is difficult to recover. It is difficult for Armenians in Armenia to understand or gauge how events and portrayals, large and small, as refracted through the distinctly distortive lens of international and Armenian media, affect Diasporan attitudes toward Armenia. Since Armenia’s image is often not of Armenia’s making, this factor in Armenia-Diaspora relations can and is sometimes manipulated for “divide and conquer” purposes, in particular, the “good Armenian/bad Armenian”, “reasonable Armenian/extremist Armenian” dichotomy. In both of the largest Diasporan communities, Russia and America, negative images of Armenians, usually based on stereotypes of “similar” peoples, erode the individual Armenian’s willingness to identify strongly as Armenians and accelerate the existing urge to assimilate. As an exogenous negative factor, Diasporans, like others, try to dissociate from it. So in Russia, negative images of Caucasians, particularly, of Chechens as “black” people, impact swarthy Armenians who speak Russian with an accent and are harassed by law-enforcement and others, despite Armenian’s affinity for Russian culture and despite having no connection, religious, ethnic, or cultural tie with Chechens.

Similarly in America, as Italians are becoming less “ethnic” and political correctness or geo-politics makes perjorative depictions of certain groups taboo (e.g., Jews, Muslims, Hispanics, or Russians), it is easy for Hollywood to pick on a small ethnic group that has turned up on its doorstep. The Armenians’ Soviet/post-Soviet mores and values are similar enough to older Italian or Hispanic stereotypes that it is easy to substitute them, with little adjustment, for the bulk of the American audience which has little immediate contact with or independent information about Armenians. Thus, Armenian image and self-image is in danger of being hijacked.

The negative images that have surfaced in 2003 in American majority culture (mainstream national broadcasting), largely drawn from majority culture stereotypes of “ethnics” based on impressions from this LA post-Independence Diaspora, are of concern to Diasporans generally, as, for instance, the “old-world” mafia stereotype in *Hack* or *Dragnet*, or the low culture mockery in *Friends*. Not only do these result in dissociation by Diasporans that are already only loosely tied to Armenian-identity, but among the more engaged they engender subculture fractures and recrimination, wherein a group is held responsible for negative actions of individuals within the group on the presumption, sometimes partly true, but usually mostly false, that the group can control the individual negative action, resulting in multiple
levels of fragmentation, between the subcultures and also within the
subcultures, providing fertile ground for “divide and conquer” processes. As
temper flares and mud is slung, the “bystander” Diasporans quite instinctively
get out of harm’s way, often bruised for a time, sometimes bruised for a life-
time. Indeed, this dynamic, is roughly the same dynamic that has resulted in
the wounded post-independence Armenian emigration.

6. External Factors that Impact Relationship between Armenia and Diaspora,
including Geopolitical Orientation, Economic Disparities

6.1. Relationship to non-Armenian Communities & Cultures – Ghettoization vs.
Integration

Ghettoization is a transitory phenomenon in most newly established
Diasporan communities, or among new waves of Diasporans living in
multicultural societies. Given the strong pressures to integrate into the
majority culture and the values and reasons for most emigration, ghettoization
and ethnic enclaves are precarious, and likely to dwindle. Geopolitics
impacts Diasporan attitudes toward Armenia. If Armenia tilts toward Russia,
certain other Diasporan communities respond with the majority culture
attitude toward Russia (residual cold-War mentality), or the vice versa. Such
tilts also put wedges between Diasporan communities vying for ascendancy or
influence in the Diaspora or with respect to Armenia. The economic
disparities between various Diasporan communities and between Diasporans
and Armenians in Armenia also are a source of friction, jealousy, domineering
attitudes, and resentment. A Diasporan, who would not otherwise be very
influential, because of the disparity in income thinks of him or herself as
superior to the less wealthy Armenians in Armenia. This sometimes
manifests itself in “ugly Diasporan” behavior, which erodes relations between
the Diaspora and Armenia.

A countercurrent has emerged as well. In comparison with what many people
view as post-modern decadence, violence and materialism, Armenia, with
relative peace, lower cost of living, and more traditional way of life, is
becoming an attractive place to live, study, retire and vacation. Diasporans
and some non-Armenians are moving to Armenia to live, work, raise families,
and retire. They are volunteering time and energy and engaging in much
constructive work, including teaching and volunteer service in Armenia.
There are also a small but growing number of repatriates who are building
businesses, creating jobs, giving hope, sharing know-how, and building
bridges between the Diaspora and Armenia.
III. Scenario Descriptions and Interrelations with Armenia2020 Scenarios

The structure of Armenia-Diaspora relations and the Diaspora’s potential role in the development of Armenia are closely intertwined. Without a suitable structure to define roles and provide a vehicle for engagement, Armenia-Diaspora relations will continue to founder in an indefinite state of often short-lived, often contradictory, and often inefficient ad hoc efforts, dominated by personalities and inertia, rather than policy and well-designed initiatives.

7. Descriptions of Diaspora-Homeland Scenarios (DH Scenarios)

7.1. Hub & Spokes – Under this scenario, the Armenian state becomes the hub of the nation and the focus of national community world-wide. The needs and priorities of Armenia drive the interaction and give energy to the nation, which is multiplied and supported by the Diaspora.

Drivers favoring this scenario:

The Armenian state’s stability as a prosperous, law-governed, reliable leader of the nation and participatory democracy, which corresponds to the Diaspora image of Armenia, making the Diaspora willing to engage and see building an exemplary country as the nation’s work. Dual citizenship, common agenda on key issues, e.g., genocide recognition, Artsakh, and symbolic issues, e.g., Traditional Orthography, status of Western Armenian, unified Church, higher profile for Christianity in Armenia.

Drivers disfavoring this scenario:

US-Russia geopolitical re-polarization, alienation between the new and old Diaspora, premature attempts to unify the Diaspora communities or attempts to assert ascendancy among Diasporan communities, leading to rivalry incompatible with the highly cooperative and interdependent hub-and-spokes model, fracture over Genocide recognition, continued division in the Church, insular thinking that impeded Armenia’s integration into the global economy, widening the culture gap between the Diaspora and Armenia.

7.2. Bilateral – Organized Diaspora vs. Armenian State. Under this scenario, the nation splits into two organic parts, reverting in some ways to the status during the Cold War, each coherent in itself and relating to the other in a bilateral way, at its best complementary mutual support, at its worst a house divided against itself, competing with each other to be the voice of the Armenian nation and the keeper of the national heritage. Their relations are mediated by organized elites, submerging the voices of individual communities. The silent majority, which is largely a local phenomenon, is sidelined, as the supranational elite organize the Diaspora delegation to the Armenian state.

Drivers favoring this scenario:
Armenia fails to become a prosperous democracy soon enough, so the Diaspora in an effort to consolidate and preserve the nation, organizes itself for the long haul. Diasporan organizations, sensing danger to Armenian national continuity, close ranks in a kind of siege mentality. The old Diaspora fades due to alienation from both the new Diaspora and Armenia, and the new Diaspora’s antipathy to Armenia drives them toward an “Armenia-in-exile” mentality and model.

Drivers disfavoring this scenario:

Centripetal forces and convergence of culture and values in the Diaspora and Armenia; lateral, inclusive leadership both in the Diaspora and Armenia; a strong Armenian state that reaches out to the Diaspora.

7.3. **Organized Decentralization** – Under this scenario, the various communities around the world, become more inclusive and organized, each dealing with its own potential/unaffiliated members. The Armenian State is the first among equals and the inter-relations between Diaspora and Armenia are effected through an overlay of coordinating bodies and mechanisms for participation.

Drivers favoring this scenario:

Armenia fails to establish institutions and values compatible with the Diasporan aspiration for a prosperous, democratic country, thus it cannot assume leadership of the nation. Diasporan communities lacking this catalyst to cooperation, continue to develop on their own, with their local elites, pursuing elite-to-elite relations among themselves and with Armenia. Unaffiliated Diasporans also engage Armenia individually.

Drivers disfavoring this scenario:

Due to generation change, alienation between the new and old Diasporas and globalization/assimilation, Diasporan elites and “fixed menu” institutions are growing weaker and losing their constituency. US-Russian polarization could create a rivalry, or revolving door, depending upon which pole the Armenian government gravitates to at any given time.

7.4. **Ad Hoc Decentralization** – Under this scenario, Armenia on its own, and the Diasporan communities on their own. It is a decentralized, non-organic state, without sustained coordination. The rift between the Diaspora and Armenia is addressed by sporadic/ad hoc coordination efforts. The most likely path to this state of decentralized system could be the result of a number of factors, including distrust; cultural drift; lack of sufficient contact not only between Diaspora and Armenia, but also between Armenian communities; capture of the communities by elites; apathy among the members of the communities. The efforts to relate to each other are the lowest common denominator, with minimal accommodation of each other’s needs, visions, cultural biases, etc. Each community in this model tends to view itself as self-contained, perhaps the
superior bearer of Armenian culture, and therefore is unwilling to accommodate the other for the greater good of the whole nation, resulting in a kind of prisoner’s dilemma or low equilibrium trap.

This is a fairly unstable state, with each Diasporan community and sub-cultures and elites within them, vying for ascendency. Sporadic contacts, such as conferences, exhibitions, etc. help to bring them together, but may not be conducive to relationship building. Instead, without sufficient exposure to each other, these contacts reinforce stereotypes and engender friction, deepening distrust and reinforcing the lowest common denominator of minimal commitment to nation, to avoid unpleasant or non-productive activities. For sub-culture and communities elites, the need to cooperate and create an overarching hierarchy entails subordination, which is incompatible with the status and role they have been habituated to and associate with their involvement in things Armenian. This scenario is closest to our current situation and likely trajectory.

Drivers favoring this scenario:

The tendency toward fragmentation - deepening differences in various community culture; negative image of Armenia; friction within communities; assimilation and loss of critical mass resulting in abandonment to the fixed menu elite, disappointment or friction from sporadic interaction, which results in centrifugal dynamic; unfulfilled expectation that the state or church will provide institutional leadership or be a catalyst for institutional relations.

Drivers disfavoring this scenario:

Convergence in majority cultures that provide shared ground rules for transnational ethic communities, such as Armenians; generation change in communities with more readiness for cooperation; high levels of contact between Armenia and Diasporans results in a hybrid culture, with Armenia being the common ground for interactions not only between Armenia and Diaspora, but also among Diasporans (move toward hub-and-spokes); external pressures and threats that bring defensive unity and consolidation; state and/or church that catalyzes relations or rises to the challenge of transnational institution. Ad hoc decentralization without institutional relations is a defensive arrangement that aims to assure some minimal survival by creating a number of self-sustaining cells of Armenian culture; but it is unstable, easily degenerating into repolarization or alienation.

7.5. Repolarization – Russophile vs. Westernizing. Overlapping Constituencies - fragmented along new fault lines with Russian Diaspora and pro-Russian Hayastantsi vs. Western Diaspora and pro-Western Hayastantsis. This is a replay of the Cold War, which tends toward non-overlapping constituencies in the long run. If the polarized communities are significant enough to vie for power and the outside groups, both Diasporan and foreign governments, are
engaged, Armenia could be destabilized, highly tense, paralyzed without a critical mass to move in any direction, stagnate or devolve into civil war or its equivalent.

Drivers favoring this scenario:

Alienation between old and new Diasporas, US-Russian geopolitical competition in the mid-East, for example, or the Caucasus.

Drivers disfavoring this scenario:

Cooperative and centripetal forces, e.g., convergence, hybridization, economic interests, overarching pan-national institutions such as church, cultural events, other bond-building activities.

7.6. Alienation – This scenario is among the worst case outcomes. In this scenario, apathy turns to disaffection and engaged Armenians dwindle, while “fixed menu” elites battle over who’s the “true” Armenian. Cultural differences in communities around the world grow deeper because of assimilation and foreign powers insert a wedge between various communities in a divide and conquer manoeuvre that causes communities to distance themselves from each other. It devolves into in-fighting among elites, who fail to find enough common ground for a shared Armenian agenda, which then causes a battle over Armenian identity – who is the “true” Armenian, based on intolerance and struggle over greater control over a smaller pie.

8. Evolution of DH Scenarios

Today Scenario 4 (Ad Hoc Decentralization) comes closest to the current state. This situation could devolve into Scenario 5 (Repolarization) or 6 (Alienation) if the centrifugal forces of assimilation or geopolitical polarization create deep enough rifts to set off a rivalry between Diasporan communities or between Armenia and Diaspora. Internal efforts to claim national leadership or ascendancy without first securing consensus may also set off this devolution into fragmentation in a vicious circle of intolerance and calcification of values.

Scenario 4 (Ad Hoc Decentralization) could evolve into Scenarios 1 (Hub & Spokes), 2 (Bilateralism) or 3 (Organized Decentralization). Scenario 1 (Hub & Spokes) is predicated on a flexible, modern, open Armenian state and sufficient common values and organization among the Diasporan communities to permit the constituent parts to trust each other enough to attain this organic re-connection where the whole is more than the sum of its parts. Scenario 2 (Bilateralism) is predicated on a pan-national institutional vacuum, where rivalries and cultural differences (political as well as ethnic culture), create enough of a rift between Armenia and the Diaspora that the Diaspora makes a preservationist/protectionist move to organize itself in order to be self-sufficient and a
larger voice in dealing with Armenia, or could result in “complementary mutual support” as a transition to Scenario 3 (Organized Decentralization). This can be viewed in a sense as a replay of Sovietization in 1921 and the subsequent Cold War. Scenario 3 (Organized Decentralization) is predicated on the emergence of one or more pan-national institutions, in the first instance the State or Church, rising to the occasion and acting as an honest broker or catalyst for national reconnection by projecting a vision and values acceptable or inspiring for the engaged and silent majority of Armenians. It is somewhat akin to the system of Armenian cultural survival created by the Armenian church during Turkic and Mongol invasions. It entails a tolerant common space where Armenians can reconnect and reconstitute a sense of national community.


9.1. An “EU Integration” scenario is compatible with Diaspora-Homeland (“DH”) Scenarios 1 through 3, and possibly Scenario 4. Scenario 1 would be the most effective for EU integration, since it maximizes the intermediary role of the Diaspora in the EU and global economy. Scenario 4 is only marginally compatible with effective integration with the EU, for if Armenians are not able to establish effective institutional relations among themselves, this casts doubt on Armenia’s ability to integrate into the more culturally distinct EU.

9.2. A “Back to Russia” Big Brother Scenario is compatible with the fragmented or polarized scenarios for the Diaspora - scenarios 3, 4, 5 and 6, but incompatible with 1 or 2, which are predicated on generally good relations among Diaspora communities which is not likely if Russian dominance in Armenia fragments the Diaspora as in Soviet times.

9.3. A “Multinational Dominance” Big Brother scenario is compatible with DH Scenarios 1 (Hub & Spokes) (in case of parity among Russian and Western companies), 3 (Organized Decentralization), 4 (Ad Hoc Decentralization) and 5 (Repolarization) in case of dominance of either Russian or Western Companies). A strong organized Diaspora is not generally compatible with multi-national dominance, since the rivalry of multi-nationals from each major geopolitical bloc will expect loyalty and special favors from Diasporans from that bloc that could result in inter-Diasporan rivalries.

9.4. A “Singapore” scenario is compatible with DH Scenarios 1, 3, 4. As for the EU Integration Scenario, DH Scenario 1 (Hub & Spokes) would provide an effective network that could promote global trade and integration essential for the Singapore scenario. DH Scenario 3 (Organized Decentralization) would also provide a lower level of networking that could support the Singapore scenario. DH Scenario 4 (Ad hoc Decentralization), while not as advantageous as DH Scenarios 1 & 3, is not incompatible with the Singapore regional model. DH Scenarios 2, 5 & 6 could have a negative impact on the Singapore scenario by interfering with the regional ascendancy, internal cohesiveness, or global integration on which the Singapore scenario depends.
9.5. A “Closed Oligarchic Society” scenario is compatible with DH Scenarios 4, 5 and 6 (and possibly 2 if defensive Diaspora – last bastion of Armenian culture). DH Scenarios 4 (Ad hoc Decentralization), 5 (Repolarization) or 6 (Alienation) are conducive to the devolution of Armenia into a relatively closed society, minimally integrated into the global market, with an economy and polity dominated by an less than democratic economic-political elite. DH Scenarios 1 and 3, with their strong emphasis on cooperation with the Diaspora are not compatible with this Scenario’s closed society and domination by a less than democratic economic-political elite. DH Scenario 2 could evolve as a reaction to this scenario, with the Diaspora coalescing in a defensive mode as that last bastion of “true” Armenian culture.

9.6. A “Buffer State” scenario is compatible with scenario 4, 5, 6. DH Scenarios 4 (ad hoc decentralization), 5 (Repolarization) or 6 (Alienation) are conducive to reversion to historical type as a regional buffer state caught between Byzantine-Russian, Western-European, Turkic-Central Asia, and Persian-Islamic. The DH Scenarios 1 and 3 could provide protection against this reversion to historical type by providing global integration and internal stability more in line with global democratic/free market values, prosperity, and international interests and investments that make the Buffer State scenario less desirable for those interests. DH Scenario 2 could again be a defensive reaction by the Diaspora to the endangered state of Armenia, but could also precipitate the Buffer State scenario by attempting to “go it alone” as an independent organized Armenian subculture.

10. Diaspora-Homeland Scenario Trajectories

10.1. Hub & Spoke tends to move Armenia toward the EU or Singapore Scenarios, as effective networking and global integration are key pre-conditions for the EU and Singapore Scenarios.

10.2. Bilateralism is more likely a defensive reaction than a driver. Nevertheless, once established it would probably predispose Armenia away from global integration, as it is based on a lack of capacity for effective networking and therefore tends to lead to the Closed Oligarchic or Buffer State Scenarios.

10.3. Organized Decentralization tends to move Armenia toward the EU or Singapore Scenarios, and may prevent devolution into the Closed Oligarchic or Buffer State Scenarios.

10.4. Ad Hoc Decentralization tends to move Armenia toward the Closed Oligarchic or Buffer State Scenarios, with the economic and power vacuum permitting Russia or Multinational domination to lead to Big Brother scenarios.

10.5. Repolarization is a parallel development of Big Brother Russia Scenarios, which is reversion to the immediately preceding 19-20th century historical type.

10.6. Alienation tends to move Armenia toward Closed Oligarchic or Buffer State Scenarios because of the economic and political power vacuum, or to drive
Armenia toward Big Brother Russia Scenario where Russian steps into the vacuum in its sphere of influence.
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